An Empirical Assessment of Security Risks of Global Android Banking Apps by Chen, Sen et al.
1AUSERA: Large-Scale Automated Security Risk
Assessment of Global Mobile Banking Apps
Sen Chen∗, Guozhu Meng‡, Ting Su†, Lingling Fan∗, Minhui Xue§, Yinxing Xue¶, Yang Liu†, Lihua Xu¶
∗East China Normal University, †Nanyang Technological University
‡Chinese Academy of Sciences, §Optus Macquarie University Cyber Security Hub and Data61-CSIRO
¶University of Science and Technology of China, ‖New York University Shanghai
Abstract—Contemporary financial technology (FinTech) that enables cashless mobile payment has been widely adopted by financial
institutions, such as banks, by virtue of its convenience and efficiency. However, FinTech makes massive and dynamic transactions
susceptible to security risks. Given large financial losses caused by such vulnerabilities, regulatory technology (RegTech) has been
developed, but more comprehensive security risk assessment is specifically desired to develop robust, scalable, and efficient financial
activities. In this paper, we undertake the first automated security risk assessment and focus on global banking apps to examine
FinTech. First, we analyze a large number of banking apps and propose a comprehensive set of security weaknesses widely present in
these apps. Second, we design a three-phase automated security risk assessment system (AUSERA), which combines natural
language processing and static program analysis of data and control flows, to efficiently identify security weaknesses of banking apps.
We performed experiments on 693 real-world banking apps across over 80 countries and unveiled 2,157 weaknesses. To date, 21
banks have acknowledged the weaknesses that we reported. We find that outdated version of banking apps, pollution from third-party
libraries, and weak hash functions are highly prone to being exploited by attackers. We also show that banking apps of different
provenance exhibit various types of security weaknesses, mainly due to economies and regulations that take shape. Given the drastic
change in the nature of intermediation, it behooves the RegTech companies and all stakeholders to understand the characteristics and
consequences of security risks brought by contemporary FinTech.
Index Terms—Mobile Banking Apps, Security Risk Assessment, Security Weaknesses
F
1 INTRODUCTION
CONTEMPORARY financial technology (FinTech) that en-courages cashless mobile payment has significantly
fragmented the traditional financial services, beginning with
the first ATM and culminating in e-banking. These massive
dynamic transactions have paved a real path to global
financial inclusion, stimulating economic growth and em-
ployment among both developed and developing countries.
However, FinTech also presents new challenges for financial
regulators, such as flaws and vulnerabilities that cause huge
financial loss [1, 2, 3], thereby necessitating a parallel de-
velopment of recent regulatory technology (RegTech) [4]. In
particular, regulators should develop a robust, scalable, and
quick solution that facilitates financial innovation and mar-
ket confidence, aided by the use of comprehensive security
risk assessment.
We, hereby, take large-scale banking apps as a peephole
to examine contemporary FinTech which is deeply inter-
twined with the traditional financial infrastructure. Users
often misconceive that banking apps provide secure trans-
actions and provide an easy-to-use interface, by assuming
all communications are done between local banking apps
and remote bank servers securely (e.g., over HTTPS). Un-
fortunately, this assumption does not always hold. After
examining many real-world banking apps, we find new
types of weaknesses that can hardly be discovered by
existing industrial and open-source tools [5, 6, 7, 8]. For
example, in a popular banking app from Google Play, a
user will be asked to register with her personally identifiable
information, including first name, last name, password, and
address. After the user clicks the “register” button, the
app sends an SMS attached with the sensitive data (in
plaintext) to authenticate that user, but the data is stored
in the SMS outbox unexpectedly. If an attacker registers a
content observer to the SMS outbox on the mobile device
with READ_SMS permission, the user’s sensitive data can
be easily intercepted by the attacker who impersonates that
user to manipulate her legitimate banking account. Indeed,
many other real-world banking-specific weaknesses and
attacks have been witnessed globally [1, 9, 10, 11]. Therefore,
developing security risk assessment is highly desirable for
FinTech. Understanding at scale the banking entities that
own these mobile banking services (e.g., how they operate,
their relationships with subsidiaries, and what the regu-
lations take shape) is critical to the sustainable growth of
FinTech.
In this paper, we undertake the first automated security
risk assessment of large-scale global banking apps, whereby
regulators can locate the security risks of banking apps
and inform security teams of patching the weaknesses ex-
peditiously. However, existing state-of-the-art assessment
approaches impose several limitations: (1) current studies
lack a comprehensive baseline of security weaknesses to
ensure an overall assessment of banking apps. If conclusions
are drawn from small-scale manual analysis [12, 13, 14, 15],
they are more likely to be biased and cannot represent
the security status of the entire mobile banking ecosystem;
(2) the current off-the-shelf services (e.g., QIHOO360 [5])
and open-source tools (e.g., ANDROBUGS [6]) usually focus
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2on generic categories of apps, not directly applicable to
financial apps. In addition, these industrial tools only use
syntax-based scanning to perform a security check during
app development, which will incur large numbers of false
positives (e.g., the influence of dead code); (3) for recent
cryptographic misuses [16] and inappropriate SSL/TLS im-
plementations [17, 18, 19, 20] reported for years, it still
appears unknown why so many security weaknesses of
banking apps are not yet patched [15].
To address these limitations and challenges, our
automated security risk assessment system (AUSERA) com-
bines natural language processing (NLP) techniques and
static analysis (e.g., data flow analysis). The system has
three major components: (1) sensitive data tagging, where we
use word embeddings to identify sensitive data contained
in banking apps, and assign the semantics to declared
variables in code; (2) function identification, which concen-
trates on the very code related to key modules in banking
apps and determines the behavior of a piece of code; (3)
weakness detection, which tags sensitive data and functions,
and performs static analysis on banking apps to check if
any weakness is included. By leveraging these techniques,
we cast our research in a comprehensive and automated
fashion, and manage to explore the security impact and
reduce the gap between academia and industry.
We conduct our experiments on a real-world dataset,
comprising collectively 693 banking apps across over 80
countries. To our knowledge, this is the largest banking app
dataset taken into study to date. We finally identify 2,157
weaknesses in total, including botched certification valida-
tion, weak authentication protocols, and privacy violations.
We further study these apps to explore the demographic
and longitudinal results and security impact which could
interpret the drastic change in the nature of intermedia-
tion. Banking apps across different regions exhibit various
types of security status, mainly due to different economies
(e.g., small village banks) and financial regulations (e.g.,
GDPR [21]) that take shape. Weaknesses of apps vary across
different markets by countries and bring version fragmenta-
tion problem. Apps owned by subsidiary banks are always
less secure than or equivalent to those owned by parent
banks. This observation is evidenced by the South Korean
version of the Citibank app and the Chinese version of the
HSBC app.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We develop and integrate a set of baseline security
policies into the overall security assessment that cor-
responds to popular attack strategies.
• We develop the first automated security risk assessment
system (AUSERA), to quickly identify security weak-
nesses of banking apps, with precision of over 98%,
outperforming 4 state-of-the-art industrial and open-
source tools [5, 6, 7, 8]. The detection approach also
combines NLP techniques and static program analysis
of data and control flows.
• We take a large-scale measurement analysis on 693
banking apps, the largest dataset taken into study to
date, which was collected across over 80 countries.
These in-depth studies include demographic and lon-
gitudinal analysis.
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Fig. 1. Architecture of banking apps. The dotted lines show the flows of
data.
• We contact banking entities to report our found weak-
nesses and provide simple-but-concrete recommenda-
tions. To date, 21 banks have acknowledged our results,
and 52 reported weaknesses have been patched by the
corresponding banks.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to provide
systematic study to bridge the gap between banking entities
and security researchers from academia toward automati-
cally assessing security weaknesses of apps. We hope that
our study can provide insights and experience for RegTech
companies and therefore stakeholders can understand the
characteristics and consequences of security risks brought
by FinTech.
Ethical Considerations. In this paper, we carefully designed
our experiments and conducted attacks to avoid ethical
issues. We demonstrated proof-of-concept exploits in a re-
stricted local environment, in which we did not eavesdrop
on a public network or intercept messages. We ensure that
these exploits did not send any forged message to bank
servers to cause any unexpected damage or do any harm
to ordinary users. Furthermore, we have anonymized all the
names of banking entities with specific security weaknesses,
so that only the authors know their identities. Finally, we
have reported all our findings and detailed security risk
reports to the related banks, expecting them to enhance the
security of their apps.
2 TAXONOMY OF SECURITY WEAKNESSES WITHIN
BANKING APPS
In this section, we first introduce banking apps, then de-
velop and integrate a comprehensive baseline of security
weaknesses. We finally propose our threat model.
2.1 Banking Apps
Banking apps, different from ordinary apps, have their own
architecture paradigms to achieve financial transactions [22].
Fig. 1 shows the basic architecture, distilled by our investi-
gation on the customer guidelines and their corresponding
implementations. A banking app is generally composed of
two layers, i.e., the GUI layer (interact with users) and the
business logic layer (perform financial transactions). The
app communicates with the bank server to commit changes
via HTTPS. During the operation of a banking app, sensitive
data (e.g., identity, credentials) may be manipulated by one
single module, flowing from one module to another, or
sent to the server via communication channels. Here, the
data are considered sensitive, unless being prevented from
leaking or hijacking by third parties, free from any loss
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Taxonomy of security weaknesses in our study and comparisons with existing tools and research works.
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(C1) Input Harvest Sensitive data (e.g., credentials) harvested via screenshots  G#
(C2) Data Storage
Sensitive data (e.g., PIN) stored in shared preferences  #
Password stored in webview.db  
Sensitive data (e.g., firstname) logged  G# # #
Sensitive data (e.g., transfer history) stored on SD Card  
Sensitive data (e.g., testing user info) written in text file  
(C3) Data Transmission
Sensitive data (e.g., pincode) transmitted via SMS  # #
ICC leaked
via dynamically registered Receiver  G#via implicit Intent
via Component export G# G#
(C4) Communication
Infrastructure
Only uses HTTP protocol  #
Uses invalid certificates (i.e., expiration, SHA-1 used)  
Uses invalid
certificate
authentication
allows all hostname request  G# G# G#uses invalid hostname verification  G#
uses invalid server verification  G# G# G# # #
Uses hard-coded encryption key  G# #
Uses improper
AES encryption
uses insecure DES/Blowfish encryption  # #
uses improper function (e.g., ECB mode)  G# G# G#
Uses improper
RSA encryption
no RSA  
uses improper function (e.g., NoPadding)  
Uses insecure SecureRandom (i.e., setSeed)  G# G#
Uses insecure hash function (i.e., MD5, SHA-1)  G#
 : Automated flow analysis G#: Syntax-based scanning #: Manual analysis : Automated analysis by MALLODROID [17]
of confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA [23]) in
financial services.
2.2 Taxonomy of Security Weaknesses
We develop and integrate security weaknesses for Android
apps from prior research [12, 13, 14, 15], best industrial
practice guidelines and reports (e.g., OWASP [24], Google
Android Documentation [25], and AppKnox security re-
ports [2, 3]), NowSecure reports [26], and security weakness
and vulnerability databases (e.g., CWE [27], CVE [28]). We
take an in-depth look at the specific key businesses of
banking apps, mainly focusing on weaknesses w.r.t. sensi-
tive data, since the biggest threat to banking apps comes
from manipulation of digital assets and routine financial
activities. As such, we elicit sensitive data associated with
contained businesses in banking apps, and identify potential
attack surfaces (i.e., exploitable points) in terms of sensitive
data’s existence states. As shown in Table 1, sensitive data
may be exposed to attackers at the input end (i.e., Input
Harvest), saved into persistent storage (i.e., Data Storage),
transmitted within one app (i.e., Data Transmission), and sent
to the remote (i.e., Communication Infrastructure). Based on
these attack surfaces, we develop and integrate a baseline to
assess security risks of banking apps (Column 1 of Table 1).
Input Harvest. Confidential inputs and user relevant sen-
sitive data (e.g., transaction details) can be harvested via
UI screenshot by malicious apps on rooted devices, or even
adb-enabled devices without root [29].
Data Storage. An adversary is able to obtain data stored in
local storage (e.g., shared preference, webview.db) on rooted
devices or external storage (e.g., SD Card), and also from the
output of the Android logging system.
Data Transmission. Sensitive data transmission via SMS can
be easily intercepted by malware observing the outbox of
Android SMS service. So if banking apps resort to SMS as a
vehicle of sensitive data, an attacker can easily harvest them,
and further compromise financial accounts. Moreover, data
leakage via inter-component communication (ICC) is an-
other potential threat, allowing third parties to obtain data
from banking apps by making implicit intent calls, dynamic
registration of a broadcast Receiver, or component export.
Communication Infrastructure. MITM attack, as the main
threat to communication infrastructure, can obtain sensitive
data through sniffing network traffic between client and
server, thereby sending fake data to either party. This kind
of attack is generally achieved due to improper authenti-
cation protocols, insecure cryptography, lack of certificate
verification, etc.
Columns 3∼7 show the weakness points addressed
by our proposed system, AUSERA, and the state-of-the-
practice tools (i.e., QIHOO360, ANDROBUGS, QARK [8] and
MOBSF [7]). Our baseline is comprehensive by incorporat-
ing multiple categories and sets up a solid foundation for
analyzing weaknesses for banking apps.
2.3 Threat Model
On top of the security risk baseline, we propose a threat
model. We assume two types of adversaries as follows:
• App Adversary. We assume that, due to both the se-
curity weakness presented in C1∼C3 of Table 1 and a
crafted malicious app pre-installed by an app adver-
sary, all sensitive data that leak to these sinks can be
ultimately obtained.
• Communication Adversary. We assume that adver-
saries are able to obtain all communication data be-
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tween banking apps and the corresponding bank
servers. If the communication data are plain text with-
out encryption, adversaries can immediately read them
and subsequently subvert banking apps. If the commu-
nication data are encrypted with weak authentication or
vulnerable cryptographic algorithms, it is still possible
for adversaries to crack communication in practice.
All these aforementioned scenarios lead to the security
weakness of C4 in Table 1.
3 AUTOMATED SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT
In this section, we propose AUSERA, a three-phase detection
system, to automatically assess security risk of banking
apps.
3.1 Approach Overview
AUSERA takes as input each app a ∈ A (i.e., whole dataset
of banking apps), and the set of sensitive data D, the set of
sinks S, the set of vulnerable code C, and the set of entry
points E, guided by the baseline weaknesses B, and ulti-
mately outputs the set of security weaknesses, damage, and
potential attacks la ∈ L of the app a. However, this problem
is challenging: (1) we need to detect security weaknesses for
domain-specific apps (i.e., banking apps) instead of generic
ones; and (2) we need to provide precise, developer-actionable
weakness reports — reduce as many false positives as pos-
sible and provide context-aware information for weakness
confirmation. To this end, AUSERA proceeds in three phases
(see Fig. 2):
• Sensitive data tagging, which identifies sensitive data
contained in banking apps, and assigns the semantics to
declared variables in code w.r.t. the business logic.
• Function identification, which concentrates on the very
code w.r.t. key modules in banking apps. Based on API
invocations (or their call sequence patterns), AUSERA
determines the behavior of a piece of code.
• Weakness detection, which takes as input the tagged
sensitive data and functions, and performs static analysis
on the banking apps to check if any weaknesses presented
in the proposed baseline are included.
3.2 Sensitive Data Tagging
As discussed in Section 2, we are concerned with the sen-
sitive data enclosed in the bank’s key businesses that may
incur security risks. Therefore, in this section, we tag data (in
the format of variable) in code with sensitivity according to
its indicated text [30]. As a result, we derive a list of sensitive
data that is relevant to banking apps’ core financial services.
“Financial services of banking apps” are services listed in
Fig. 1 (e.g. Login, Register, and Payment). We view these
services as guidance to manually extract keywords that are
relevant to banking apps’ core functionalities. The technique
is detailed as follows.
Fig. 3 shows the four steps: (1) string extraction to ex-
tract all strings in xml files and R.class by reverse en-
gineering. Generally, the string presented in a TextView
describes the semantics of the content in its subsequent
element, e.g., an EditText or another TextView. To extract
both inputs and transfer data from bank server, we con-
sider the mapping of {〈TextView, EditText〉, 〈TextView,
TextView〉}. For example, account balance should be la-
beled as 〈“text_balance,” data from bank server〉. Thus,
we extract such a kind of strings as corpus to infer the seman-
tics of displayed data in context; (2) keyword construction to
extract sensitive keywords from this corpus with NLP tech-
niques. To avoid missing similar keywords and to remain
the latent semantics among keywords, we further employ
WORD2VEC [31] to supplement the corpus of keywords
by loading .bin word vector trained model, utilizing the
sentences extracted by SUPOR [30] from 54,371 apps. These
keywords are able to tag the semantics of the view elements
in xml files. After that, we construct a keyword database for
sensitive data tagging; (3) variable extraction, which elicits
variables defined in Java classes; (4) sensitive data tagging,
which glues the variables and the tagged view elements
together. One variable in code binds to a specific view
element by invoking method findViewById(). As a result,
sensitive data are tagged with its semantics in the format
of 〈variable, keyword〉. AUSERA extracts 70 keywords in
total from 693 banking apps to test, and these keywords can
be categorized into four types as shown in Table 2. The full
list of keywords is publicly available online.1
In the example described in the introduction, the sen-
sitive data is tagged as 〈edit PIN, pin〉, 〈edit firstName,
firstname〉, 〈edit lastName, lastname〉, 〈edit addr, addr〉, so
that the example is confirmed to send sensitive data via
SMS.
1. www.sites.google.com/view/ausera
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Keyword examples
Category Keyword Examples #
Identity username, userid, byname, user-agent 13
Credential password, passcode, pwd, pin 11
Personal Info name, phone, email, birthday 24
Financial Info credit card, amount, payment, payee 22
3.3 Function Identification
In this section, we utilize static analysis to identify func-
tion code that is associated with weaknesses for banking
services. Such function code is categorized into two types:
Sink of Sensitive Data. The sensitive data extracted in Sec-
tion 3.2 includes user inputs and data from the bank server,
which can be obtained via getText() or findViewById().
We define them as sources. These sensitive data could be far
apart from the access of unauthorized users. However, as
discussed in Section 2, this sensitive data may be divulged
during the storage or transmission process. To achieve con-
fidentiality, the sensitive data should not flow into a code
point where unauthorized users can access via local stor-
age, external storage, logging output, SMS, and component
transition based on C2 and C3 in Table 1 (a.k.a., sink of
sensitive data). It is worth mentioning that the sinks here are
different from the sinks defined in SUSI [32]. SUSI’s sinks
are calls into any resource method (e.g., getDeviceId()
and getLatitude()) that leaks sources out of mobile
devices, such as URLConnection#openConnection and
HttpResponse#execute, while our sinks are leaking sen-
sitive data to other malicious apps or physically connected
users, by breaking the sandbox policy on Android [33].
We identify 106 vulnerable sinks [34] in total that are
likely to be exploited. The process of functional code iden-
tification is performed by using static code analysis. For ex-
ample, putString of class SharedPreferences.Editor
object saves data to local shared_prefs and could poten-
tially be accessed by other unauthorized users. In this paper,
we consider two types of sinks (i.e., storage and transmis-
sion) as insecure weaknesses, covering the 106 vulnerable
ones.
Communication Infrastructure. Communication infrastruc-
ture is indispensable to banking apps [12, 16]. It estab-
lishes a channel to communicate with remote bank servers.
However, communication infrastructure is likely to be at-
tacked, and hence it can subvert banking apps. The core
functionalities in communication infrastructure include cer-
tificate verification, cryptographic operation, and host au-
thentication. To accurately identify the functional code for
communication infrastructure, we summarize all invocation
patterns of multiple Android APIs for each functional-
ity. Taking hostname verification as an example, if there
is an invocation sequence {new X509HostnameVerifier,
setHostnameVerifier of class HttpURLConnection}, we
consider that the app has applied hostname verification dur-
ing communication. Then, we will check its implementation.
We have in total 12 groups of API invocation patterns for
communication infrastructure. We reverse-engineer banking
apps, and locate the invocations of these relevant Android
APIs. We use call graphs and component transitions to
determine their call relationship in between. After all these
ALGORITHM 1: Security Weakness Detection
Input: Each mobile banking app under analysis a ∈ A; The set of
sensitive data D; The set of sinks S; The set of vulnerable code
C; The set of entry points E
Output: The set of weaknesses la ∈ L of the app a
1 Let G be the control-flow graph of the app a and la be ∅
2 foreach Sensitive data d ∈ D do
// Identify all paths that d flows in
3 paths← ForwardDataF lowAnalysis(d,G)
4 foreach Path p ∈ paths do
5 Let s be the last statement in p
6 if s ∈ S then
7 la ← la ∪ {p}
8 foreach Vulnerable code c ∈ C do
// Identify all paths that reach c
9 paths← BackwardControlF lowAnalysis(c,G)
10 foreach Path p ∈ paths do
11 Let s be the first statement in p
12 if s ∈ E then
13 la ← la ∪ {p}
14 return la
steps, we can identify the functional code for communica-
tion infrastructure of banking apps.
3.4 Security Weakness Detection
Given a banking app, we attempt to find whether it contains
any weaknesses listed in Table 1. We employ two strategies
to detect weaknesses: a forward data flow analysis to deter-
mine whether there exist sensitive data flowing into insecure
sinks; a backward control flow analysis to check whether
the vulnerable functional code (API invocation patterns) in
communication infrastructure is truly reachable.
We carry on a forward data-flow analysis on top of
SOOT [35] by supporting intra- and inter-component com-
munication analysis. The sources are tagged sensitive data
in Section 3.2, and the sinks are the list of Android APIs
presented in Section 3.3. In the process of functional code
identification, we can obtain all vulnerable code that exists
in communication infrastructure. However, the noise may
rise because the dead code for testing purpose de facto
cannot be executed during runtime. Reaves et al. [12, 15]
found that the dead code may bring false positives to
the detection results. We perform a backward control flow
analysis, and extract all reachable call sequences according
to call graphs and component transitions. If the vulnerable
code is reachable, we determine it is a valid weakness, or
otherwise.
Algorithm 1 shows the process of weakness detection.
The input of the algorithm is a set of banking apps, con-
taining sensitive data, sinks, vulnerable code, all possible
entry points (there are basically two types of entry points:
user input [36] and system event [37]). Algorithm 1 first
proceeds with data leakage detection (lines 2-7). It figures
out that all data-flow paths start by accessing sensitive data.
If this path ends up with an insecure sink, we regard it
as a leakage. Second, it conducts a reachability analysis
(lines 8-13). Conversely, we backtrack the vulnerable code
and identify its entry point. If the entry point is a feasible
entrance leading to the vulnerable code, we regard it as a
true weakness.
6TABLE 3
Distribution of the evaluated banking apps
Continent #Developed #Developing Total
Europe 102 0 102
America 53 24 77
Asia 16 210 226
Oceania 16 0 16
Africa 0 49 49
Total 187 283 470
3.5 Implementation of AUSERA
To implement AUSERA, we combine NLP techniques and
static analysis to identify sensitive data of banking apps, and
associate them with the corresponding variables in code.
AUSERA relies on APKTOOL [38] to extract resource files
(e.g., layout files and R.class) from apks. It then uses parts-
of-speech (POS) tagger of APACHE OPENNLP-1.8.3 [39] to
parse the text labels in TextView, thereby identifying key-
words included. We manually check on these keywords to
retain ones that are sensitive and relevant to core function-
alities of banking apps. After that, we employ WORD2VEC
to supplement the keyword database by: (1) utilizing the
sentences extracted by SUPOR from 54,371 Google Play apps
to train a Bin model; (2) extending sensitive keywords by
the model; (3) filtering out as many non-sensitive keywords
as possible, to raise the accuracy of tagging.
To accomplish the detection, we summarize 12 groups of
semantic patterns (e.g., AES/ECB/NoPanding) to depict the
communication weaknesses. Then we employ a lightweight
static analysis to find the possible vulnerable patterns in
code. We obtain server certificates from package, and utilize
X509Certificate to parse their internal information (e.g.,
sign algorithm and term of validity). We check three aspects
for certificate authentication: whether the client side allows
all hostname requests; bypasses hostname verification; or
fails to implement anything in server verification method
(checkServerTrusted). The weakness “hard-coded en-
cryption key” is determined by first checking whether an en-
cryption key is embedded in code, and examining whether
it is used to encrypt sensitive data to reduce false positives.
We also check whether an encryption key is embedded
in apk package. The banking sensitive data are encrypted
with the DES or Blowfish algorithm. Using either of the
encryption mechanisms is viewed as a weakness [12, 15].
The AES forbids ECB mode because it does not provide a
general notion of privacy [16]. The padding of AES and RSA
is always improper, such as NoPadding and PKCS1, though
AES/ECB/NoPadding is very frequently used. The function
SecureRandom should not be seeded with a constant. The
hash functions MD5 and SHA-1 are insecure [40, 41].
4 EXPERIMENTS AND EVALUATION
We evaluate AUSERA’s effectiveness on the banking apps
collected. Based on the experimental results, we intend to
answer the following research questions:
RQ1. How effective is AUSERA to detect weaknesses per
se as well as in comparison with other state-of-the-
practice tools?
TABLE 4
Weaknesses in 470 banking apps
Weakness Category Weakness Type #Affected Apps
Input Harvest Screenshot 415 (88.3%)
Data Storage
SharedPreference 44
WebView DB 64
Logging 66
SD Card 14
Text File 10
Data
Transmission
SMS Leakage 18
ICC Leakage 324 (68.9%)
Communication
Infrastructure
HTTP Protocol 84
Invalid Certificate 31
Invalid Authentication 222
Hard-coded Key 30
Improper AES 131
Improper RSA 231
Insecure SecureRandom 133
Insecure Hash Function 340 (72.3%)
RQ2. What insights can be gained from those weaknesses
exposed to FinTech, such as production process, root
causes, and regulatory compliance?
RQ3. How do industrial representatives respond to weak-
nesses, and what are the gaps of understanding weak-
nesses between industry and academia?
In this paper, we answer RQ1 in Section 4 by elaborat-
ing the found weaknesses on a large-scale banking apps,
comparing with 4 state-of-the-practice tools, and illustrating
the exploitation of 4 typical weaknesses. RQ2 is answered
in Section 5.1 and 5.2 with demographic and longitudinal
analysis. To answer RQ3, we study common practices of
banking app production from industry, and then uncover
the gaps and propose recommendations in Section 5.3.
Dataset. We collected totally 693 banking apps (without
using packer techniques) across 470 unique banking entities,
where some apps have multiple versions. These apps origi-
nate from both developed and developing countries across
five continents (see breakdowns in Table 3). If banking apps
have packer and decompilation failure when using SOOT,
we thereby leave them out of our study. Table 3 indicates
that 48.1% of the banking apps are from Asia, considering
the largest population proportion (59.1%) all over the world,
and only 3.4% of apps are from Oceania, considering its
smallest population proportion (0.5%) all over the world.
The 24 banking apps of American developing countries
all originate from South America, while 16 apps of Ocea-
nian developed countries originate from Australia and New
Zealand. 16 apps of Asian developed countries originate
from Singapore, Japan, and South Korea. To our knowledge,
this is the largest banking app dataset taken into study to
date.
4.1 Evaluation on the Security Weakness Baseline
We execute AUSERA on these 470 unique banking apps
to evaluate its effectiveness and efficiency, because the
multiple versions of a banking app have many overlaps
of weaknesses. Table 4 shows results of weaknesses that
correspond to the security baseline defined in Section 2.
Input Harvest. Screenshot (88.3%), as an easy-to-use way to
harvest users’ credentials, is most likely to be neglected by
developers. Only 55 apps (e.g., Bank of Communications of
China) are protected from screenshots in our investigation.
7Data Storage. Only a small portion of apps store sensitive
data on SD Card (2.98%) and Text File (2.13%), which
are globally accessible and thereby susceptible to privacy
leakage. We show that Preference, Logging, and WebView
DB are the main channels that leak sensitive data. AUSERA
identifies 592 cases of private data leakage across 470 unique
banking apps. credentials (e.g., PIN), as the most dangerous
leakage in banking apps, appear in 82 cases and affect
64 apps. Note that banking-specific data (e.g., transaction
password and card number) accounts for 22.47%, and the
other data leakage includes personal info (e.g., Name, Phone,
and Email).
Data Transmission. We show that ICC Leakage (68.9%)
is also among the most popular weaknesses. Despite the
small portion of SMS Leakage, SMS could directly forward
credentials, thwarting confidentiality.
Communication Infrastructure. The protection of commu-
nication infrastructure in banking apps is far from satisfac-
tory. More specifically, many apps are still using HTTP to
exchange sensitive data with the remote bank server, or do
not validate the certificates of connected servers. We find
222 banking appswith invalid authentication, including 13
banking apps that have both invalid and correct SSL/TLS
implementations in source code. They establish communica-
tions with servers using different strategies. Insecure Hash
Function (72.3%) is also frequently misused.
In summary, we show that Screenshot (88.3%), Insecure
Hash Function (72.3%), and ICC Leakage (68.9%) are the
most popular weaknesses of banking apps. Meanwhile,
Invalid Authentication (222 apps) also has severe dam-
age.
4.2 Precision of AUSERA
We randomly selected 60 banking apps (12.8%) in our
dataset and manually checked the detection results to eval-
uate AUSERA’s precision, which always equals accuracy in
our case. False positive (FP) is referred to as any weakness
that are detected during static analysis but actually unreach-
able at runtime or completely mistaken. As a result, we
only found 6 false positives (corresponding to five weakness
types, i.e., Preference Leakage, Logging Leakage, SD Card
Leakage, Text File Leakage, and Hard-coded Key) from the
identified 341 weaknesses of these 60 banking apps, leading
to an average precision of 98.24% for AUSERA.
Consequently, 5 out of 6 false positives belong to sensi-
tive data leakage, because AUSERA matches variables (e.g.,
“login_fragement,” “loginpager,” “spinnerGender,”
and “pkgname.txt”) inaccurately with the keywords in our
database; the remaining one belongs to Hard-coded Key
type, due to the extracted string is relevant to exception pa-
rameters (i.e., “KeyPermanentlyInvalidateException”).
False Positive Analysis. We highlight the following three
strategies to reduce false positives. (1) AUSERA reduces
the size of our extracted keywords from 124 to 70, which
effectively reduces ambiguity of the keywords (e.g., “info”
and “status”), and hence can identify sensitive data more
accurately. (2) AUSERA utilizes newly-defined sources and
sinks, which are relevant to weaknesses of sensitive data
leakage. (3) AUSERA identifies the vulnerable code and
checks its reachability to eliminate dead code.
TABLE 5
Detection result comparisons
Tools #Type Precision Time/App (mins)
AUSERA 341 98.24% 1.6
QIHOO360 80 87.50% 8.5
ANDROBUGS 76 81.58% 1.8
QARK 93 87.10% 16.1
MOBSF 213 48.36% 2.4
In particular, we show several specific cases to ex-
plain how to incur false positives. Sensitive data disclosure
through logging is always detected by MOBSF as shown in
Table 1, but MOBSF just matches the following APIs if used
(e.g., Log.e(), Log.d(), and Log.v()). There is no doubt
that it has incurred plenty of false positives. If the data are
not sensitive, such as “menu_title,” it is very normal for
developers to log or write messages to understand the state
of their application. The risk is that some credentials (e.g.,
PIN and password) are also leaked by logging outputs.
A syntax-based scanning tool provides an incomplete
and incorrect analysis result, due to the influence of
dead code. For example, the tools detected three code
blocks violating server verification, i.e., do nothing in
checkServerTrusted. In contrast, AUSERA aims to re-
duce as minimal dead code influence as possible. Two key
strategies to eliminate such false positives are: (i) checking
whether invalid authentication is in a feasible path in call
graphs; (ii) checking whether the Class has been instanti-
ated in component transitions.
Comparisons with the State of the Practice. We compare
the detection results with 4 industrial and open-source tools,
including QIHOO360, ANDROBUGS, MOBSF, and QARK. We
randomly select 60 banking apps in our dataset for com-
parisons. All comparisons of the detection results comply
with the baseline of weaknesses in Section 2. The precisions
for these tools are obtained by manual validation through
filtering out all false positives. In addition, we run each tool
3 times to stabilize the detection accuracy.
In summary, AUSERA identifies the largest number of
weaknesses, significantly outperforming the other tools
in terms of precision. AUSERA manages to scan each app
within 1.6 mins on average, much faster than the other
tools (Since QIHOO360 is an online scanning service, we
eliminate the upload time for a fair comparison.). We
conclude that AUSERA is the most efficient system for
security risk assessment for banking apps.
4.3 Case Studies of Weaknesses
AUSERA has found a number of severe weaknesses, which
affect 431 banking apps. To showcase the exploitability of
these weaknesses, we selected four vulnerable apps and
constructed corresponding proof-of-concept attacks.
Screenshot Weakness. A∗ Bank (v3.3.1.0038) employs two-
factor authentication, i.e., a user first inputs the user-
name and password, and then enters verification code
sent by the bank server. It can be attacked if the
login page is not protected (without setting the flag
WindowManager.LayoutParams. FLAG_SECURE to pro-
hibit screenshot feature), and the verification code can be
8// Save Username and Password to Preference
private void SaveCredentials() {        
if (this.rememberMe.isChecked()) {            
Editor editor = UnamePrefs.edit();            
Editor editor1 = PasswordPrefs.edit(); 
// Save Username
editor.putString("Uname", etUsername
.getText());
// Save Password
editor1.putString("Password",etPassword
.getText());
editor.commit();            
editor1.commit();            
return;        
}
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private String IV = “fedcba9876543210”;    
private String KEY = “tQna25tR89d6af1a”;    
// Encrypt Data
public static String encryptStr(String text){        
Cipher cipher = Cipher.getIns(“AES/CBC/NoPadding”);                
cipher.init(1, KEY, IV);            
plainText = bytesToHex(cipher.doFinal());        
return text;    
}    
// Decrypt Data
public static String decryptStr(String encStr){
Cipher cipher = Cipher.getIns(“AES/CBC/NoPadding”);               
cipher.init(2, KEY, IV);            
encStr = cipher.doFinal(hexToBytes(encStr)); 
return encryptedString;    
}
Fig. 4. The simplified code of Preference
weakness in G∗
// Update new banking app version
public static void update(Context context) {        
if(checkNewVersion()){
getApk(“AndroidBankingApp.apk”, SDCard);
}
// Check banking app version
Private boolean checkNewVersion(){
Connection con = new Connection();
con.checkServerTrusted(); return true;
}
// Check bank server
public final void checkServerTrusted(X509Cert[] 
x509CertificateArr, String str) { 
// do nothing   
}
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private String IV = “fedcba9876543210”;   
private String KEY = “tQna25tR89d6af1a”;   
// Encrypt Data
public static String encryptStr(String text){        
Cipher cipher = Cipher.getIns(“AES/CBC/NoPadding”);                
cipher.init(1, KEY, IV);            
plainText = bytesToHex(cipher.doFinal());        
return text;    
}    
// Decrypt Data
public static String decryptStr(String encStr){
Cipher cipher = Cipher.getIns(“AES/CBC/NoPadding”);               
cipher.init(2, KEY, IV);            
encStr = cipher.doFinal(hexToBytes(encStr)); 
return encryptedStr;    
}
Fig. 5. The simplified code of update weak-
ness in I∗ SMS
// Updat  new banking app version
public static void update(Context context) {        
if( heckNewVersion()){
getApk(“AndroidBankingApp.apk”, SDCard);
}
// Check banking app version
Private boolean checkNewVersion(){
Connection con = new Connection();
con.checkServerTrusted(); return true;
}
// Check bank server
public final void checkServerTrusted(X509Cert[] 
x509CertificateArr, String str) { 
// do nothing   
}
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private String IV = “fedcba9876543210”;  
private String KEY = “tQna25tR89d6af1a”;  
/ Encrypt Data
public static String encryptStr(String text){  
Cipher cipher = Cipher.getIns(“AES/CBC/NoPa ding”);   
cipher.init(1, KEY, IV);  
plainText = bytesToHex(cipher.doFinal( );  
return text;  
}  
/ Decrypt Data
public static String decryptStr(String encStr){
Cipher cipher = Cipher.getIns(“AES/CBC/NoPa ding”);  
cipher.init(2, KEY, IV);  
encStr = cipher.doFinal(hexToBytes(encStr ); 
return encryptedStr;  
}
Fig. 6. The simplified code of en/decryption weak-
ness in N∗
accessed with granted permissions. As such, we generate
a malicious app that runs a service which will snapshot the
screen and read the verification code from SMS during the
process of login. As a result, the remote attacker can steal
the credentials and bypass the login authentication. Note
that the crafted malware has bypassed the security vetting
of Google Play and is successfully put on the shelf, which
makes this attack more practical [42].
Preference Weakness. Fig. 4 shows the vulnerable code of
Preference weakness in G∗ Bank (v1.1) from Algeria. This
app stores the credentials (i.e., username and password)
into Preference named UnamePrefs and PasswordPrefs
(lines 6-9). To steal these credentials, we can either (1)
create a malicious app signed with the same key, so
that it can run in the same sandbox as the victim app
on a non-rooted device; or (2) create a malicious app
that modifies the original file permission from “660”
to “777” by running Runtime.getRuntime().exec on
rooted devices [12, 15]. In either way, the malware can
access the victim’s sensitive data from the Preference.
Even worse, we find that several apps use insecure per-
missions MODE_WORLD_READABLE/WRITEABLE rather than
MODE_PRIVATE, which eases such attacks.
Version Update Weakness. I∗ SMS Bank (v5.0) is detected
as having MITM risk during version updating of which the
code is shown in Fig. 5. The app checks new versions with
bank server once started (line 3), but does not verify the
X.509 certificates from SSL servers (lines 11-15). It allows
MITM attackers to spoof the server by crafting an arbitrary
certificate. As a result, the new version can be downloaded
to SD Card from an attacker server (line 4). To exploit
this, we use BURP SUITE [43] and FIDDLER [44] to fool the
banking app, by sending a malicious app to impersonate
the most recent version [45]. After this malicious app is
installed, it serves as a phishing app to steal user credentials
and other sensitive data.
En/Decryption Attack. AUSERA detects an encryption
weakness in N∗ Bank (v1.8) as shown in Fig. 6. It leaves the
hard-coded AES keys (IV and KEY) as plain text (lines 1-2),
and uses them to encrypt and decrypt the communication
between the app and server. By leveraging these keys, we
successfully decrypt all sensitive data during communica-
tion. Moreover, AES uses block cipher modes. If we set
with NoPadding (lines 5 and 12), it is easier for attackers
to subvert encryption because they only need to decrypt
one of the blocks.
Fig. 7. Number of weaknesses of banking apps across the world
5 MEASUREMENT AND DISCOVERIES
In this section, we take a measurement analysis on top of
our detection results to attempt to interpret the nature of
security weaknesses of banking apps. We begin by taking
a demographic study of banking apps w.r.t. economies and
regulations. We then take a deep dive into how app ver-
sion updates across markets incur weaknesses. We finally
try to bridge the gap toward assessing severity of weak-
nesses among all stakeholders, to propel the mobile banking
ecosystem.
5.1 Demographic Study of Apps
Fig. 7 shows a global map of the number of weaknesses
discovered among the banking apps by continents. The heat
bar encodes the number of weaknesses the apps have, scaled
from light blue (least) to dark blue (most). In concrete, we
observe the following: (1) Weaknesses of banking apps of
Asia outnumber those of Europe (resp. North America)
by 1.56 (resp. 1.31) to 1, where each banking app of Asia
has 6.4 weaknesses on average, indicating that the bank-
ing apps of developed countries (i.e., Europe and North
America) largely have fewer weaknesses than those of de-
veloping countries. Ironically, to our surprise, we find that
weaknesses of apps of Asian developed countries slightly
outnumber (with 6.7 weaknesses per app) than those of
Asian developing countries. (2) Strikingly, banking apps of
Africa exhibit satisfactory security status, having only 4.6
weaknesses on average, some are even more secure than
those of developed countries.
The possible reasons that the security of banking apps
varies across regions can be interpreted as follows:
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Fig. 8. Number of weaknesses in each update version. The x-axis
represents the date of each release version, and the y-axis represents
the total number of weaknesses detected in current release version.
• The financial regulations and development guidelines are
different across regions, which may affect the implemen-
tation. For example, both Europe (GDPR [21]) and USA
(PCI DSS [46]) adopt very strict security and privacy
regulations. The GDPR poses a regulatory framework
that is unique to the financial service industry. Failure
to meet its requirements will come with potentially hefty
penalties [47]. This is also reflected by the 143 banking
apps from Europe and USA, where data leakage rarely
exists, with only 0.27 data leakage weakness reported per
app.
• The development budget and developers’ expertise may
affect the security of products. During our investigation,
we find that a number of local banking apps of China have
many more weaknesses than international or nationwide
ones. Perhaps because of inadequate budget for app de-
velopment, those apps released are prone to being less
secure.
• Cashless payment system has been bootstrapped in areas
where traditional banking is uneconomical and expensive,
ripping out large investment on the massively deployed
financial infrastructure. This is evidenced by the fact that
Kenya, a country in Africa, sets the world first with money
transfers by mobile [48], and 68% people in Kenya report
use of phones for a financial service [49].
Remark. We conclude that apps across different countries
exhibit various types of security status, mainly because
of different economies and regulations that take shape.
Strikingly, we find that apps of Africa have compara-
tively moderate security status, primarily because of its
high demand for cashless payment services.
5.2 Longitudinal Analysis of Version Updates & Frag-
mentation
We try to perform a longitudinal study on security risks
by revisiting the 7 apps (GCash, mPay, MOM, Zuum, Ox-
igen Wallet, Airtel Money, and mCoin) which have been
systematically studied by Reaves et al. [12], with confirmed
weaknesses. We downloaded all available versions of 6 apps
(mCoin is excluded since history versions are not publicly
available.), with totally 88 different versions, i.e., GCash (6
versions), mPay (20 versions), MOM (22 versions), Zuum (12
versions), Oxigen Wallet (12 versions), and Airtel Money (8
versions). All versions span more than two years.
Fig. 8 shows the number of detected weaknesses across
all versions of each app. We can see most of the version
updates (90%) fail to bring at least two successful patches
for weaknesses in their history versions, which echoes the
paper [15] that apps have not repaired critical vulnerabilities
in their new versions. After an in-depth manual analysis, we
find input harvest via screenshots, MITM attacks, AES/RSA
misuses, and insecure hash functions are the most popular
weaknesses that remain unfixed. Furthermore, developers
usually neglect hostname verification or server authentica-
tion, which may bring the MITM attack. These apps are
also not aware of AES/RSA misuses and insecure hash
functions, indicating that developers are still not aware of
these weaknesses perpetually.
GCash has a sharp decline from v2.4.3 to v3.0.0 in
terms of the number of weaknesses. Three weaknesses
are patched, the hard-coded encryption key, insecure Se-
cureRandom, and privacy leakage to SD Card. Reaves
et al. [12, 15] found that all six vulnerabilities still remain
in 2016 updated GCash. However, according to our security
reports, GCash has revised most vulnerabilities. In con-
trast, the weaknesses of Oxigen Wallet significantly increase
from v5.01 to v7.3.3 due to the changes of app features.
More specifically, many new weaknesses (i.e., WebView DB
Leakage, ICC Leakage, MITM Attacks, and Insecure Se-
cureRandom) are introduced, which have not been discov-
ered by [12]. They compared the code similarity between
the 2015 and 2016 versions of each app, and found some
apps have significant new code [15]. This is aligned with our
study that many banking apps have not received systematic
security check before delivery.
Furthermore, we find banking entities encounter the
version fragmentation problem especially when they release
versions to different markets by countries. We selected the
top 5 banking apps based on the S&P Global Market In-
telligence report [50] across their 30 different versions, i.e.,
Citibank (10 versions), HSBC (3 versions), Deutsche Bank (3
versions), Banco Santander (8 versions), and ICBC (6 ver-
sions). By comparing the differences of weaknesses between
these versions, we observe the following: (1) A subsidiary
bank, incorporated in the host country but owned by a
foreign parent bank, usually launches its original financial
services with most of its products, such as banking apps,
into the host market. As a result, a subsidiary bank inherits
the weaknesses from the original version of its parent bank.
This observation is evidenced by the South Korean version
of Citibank app and the Macau version of ICBC app (see
Fig. 9). (2) Due to the business difference, culture difference,
and expertise of security teams, weaknesses of apps vary
across different markets by countries. This is also evidenced
by the fact that the official app of HSBC (China) has more
weaknesses (e.g., SharedPreference Leakage, SD Card
Leakage) than that of HSBC (UK) and HSBC (Hong Kong).
This is largely because HSBC (China) is independent of the
parent bank in terms of its app development outsourcing
procedures and security teams, while in Hong Kong, as
the former UK colony, HSBC (Hong Kong) largely follows
the convention of HSBC (UK). Nevertheless, we find that
not all subsidiary banks operate under the host country’s
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Fig. 9. Flow of security weaknesses from parent banks to subsidiary
banks across the world. The flow width indicates the number of weak-
nesses originating and terminating between two corresponding banks.
Different types of banking entities are encoded by different colors.
regulations in terms of the number of banking app security
risks (Fig. 9 shows the source and host countries of flows
containing security weaknesses.).
Remark. By revisiting apps studied by previous research
and further examining them across all their publicly
available versions that have not been scrutinized before,
we conclude that app developers are still not aware of
these weaknesses perpetually. Furthermore, apps owned
by subsidiary banks are always less secure than or equiv-
alent to those owned by parent banks, for which the
assumption that subsidiary banks operate under the host
country’s regulations does not always hold true.
5.3 Feedback and Recommendations
Our study has uncovered totally 2,157 weaknesses from 693
banking apps, most of which have been reported to the
corresponding banking entities. As shown in Table 7, 21
banks have replied and confirmed these weaknesses, and
16 apps have been patched. Furthermore, we approached
the major stakeholders across the globe, such as HSBC
(UK/Hong Kong/Shanghai), OCBC (Singapore), DBS (Sin-
gapore), and BHIM (India), to understand their security
practice and policies. Through in-depth discussion, we find
they hold different mindsets toward assessing severity of
weaknesses and setting security goals. We elaborate this gap
and provide our insights on how to close it.
Lack of Effective Criteria for Rating Security Weaknesses.
An effective severity criterion of weaknesses is crucial for
banks to prioritize security patching. However, such a cri-
terion is still missing for banking apps. As a result, some
banks use CVSS [51] to determine the severity of found
TABLE 6
Different concerns from banking entities
Security Weaknesses
Concerned Screenshot, SharedPreference Leakage,
Logging Leakage, SMS Leakage, SD Card
Leakage, Text File Leakage, WebView DB
Leakage, Invalid Authentication, Hard-coded
Key, Insecure SecureRandom
Aware ICC Leakage, HTTP Protocol, Invalid Certifi-
cate, Improper AES/RSA, Insecure Hash Func-
tion
weaknesses. However, this standard is not perfect in prac-
tice [52], and provides few principled ways to characterize
security risks and potential impact. Moreover, we find these
banks hold subjective attitudes toward fixing different types
of weaknesses. For example, most banks concern obvious
privacy leakage (e.g., leakage from SharedPreference,
Logging, SMS, SD Card, Text File, and WebView DB), while
they are only aware of and somehow reluctant to fix the
weaknesses, such as ICC Leakage, Invalid Certificate, and
Insecure Hash Function. Table 6 summarizes our observa-
tions on various banks’ attitudes toward different weak-
nesses, which are classified by “Concerned” (high priority)
and “Aware” (low priority).
Lack of Systematic Security Checks and Validation Tools.
Many banking apps do not undergo a systematic security
check and validation before delivery — AUSERA discovers
a large number of high-severity weaknesses, e.g., sensitive
data leakage, hard-coded key and invalid authentication.
With the assistance of AUSERA, many banks, e.g., OCBC
and Zijin Bank, expeditiously patched the weaknesses in
their new versions. However, ironically, some banks patched
the weaknesses but introduced new ones at the same time.
For example, C∗ patched two weaknesses (i.e., Logging
Leakage and HTTP Protocol) by employing SSL over HTTPS
communication. However, new weaknesses are introduced
in the update version, i.e., the app fails to verify the identity
of bank server (checkServerTrusted).
Outdated Versions Remain in Effect in the Wild. Banks
usually hold the assumption that customers always keep
their apps updated, and thus concentrate more on the
weaknesses of latest versions than those of outdated ver-
sions. However, this assumption is not true, considering the
device fragmentation problem — Android apps have to be
compatible with more than 10 major versions of Android
OS running on over 24,000 distinct device models; and
it is also dangerous, considering attackers can leverage the
weaknesses of outdated versions to mount specific attacks.
We find that most banking apps across multiple versions
still remain in effect in the wild (e.g., Apkmonk [53]). On
average, these apps have 7.7 different versions, and the most
fragmented app has 25 versions. Therefore, we strongly
recommend banks push compulsory app updates to the
customers, especially when high-severity weaknesses were
patched.
Risks from Third-Party Libraries. Our study finds the
third-party libraries, e.g., com.google.android.gms.∗
and com.facebook.∗, are widely used in banking apps.
AUSERA detects BHIM (v2.3.6) and MyAadhar (v1.9.3) use
insecure third-party hash functions, such as MD5 and SHA-
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TABLE 7
Weaknesses tracking of 21 banking apps. “#W” is the number of
detected weaknesses. “#Patched” is the number of patched
weaknesses in update versions. “#New” is the number of
newly-introduced weaknesses in update versions. 16 banks have
already patched their banking apps, and the rest have confirmed the
weaknesses in their replies and will fix them soon by new versions.
No. Banking Apps #W
#P
at
ch
ed
#N
ew Country Downloads
1 HSBC 5 2 0 UK 5M - 10M
2 PSD Bank 3 2 0 Germany 50K - 100K
3 BBBank 3 2 0 Germany 50K - 100K
4 Intesa SanpaoloMobile 5 2 0 Italy 1M - 5M
5 AIB Mobile 8 1 0 Ireland 5M - 10M
6 Alma Bank 6 3 0 Russia 5K - 10K
7 Discover Mobile 8 4 0 USA 10M - 50M
8 Citizens Bankof Lafayette 2 1 2 USA 5K - 10K
9 CDB 6 2 2 China 5K - 10K
10 Zijin Bank 8 7 0 China 10K - 50K
11 DBS 10 0 0 Singapore 5M - 10M
12 OCBC 9 8 0 Singapore 5M - 10M
13 MyAadhar 4 0 0 India 50M - 100M
14 BHIM 3 2 0 India 10M - 50M
15 ICICI Netbanking 7 0 0 India 100M - 500M
16 ICICI Pockets 7 0 0 India 50M - 100M
17 GCash 11 8 0 Philippines 10M - 50M
18 Bank Australia 7 2 0 Australia 10K - 50K
19 CaixaBank 5 2 0 Brazil 1M - 5M
20 BMCE Bank 5 2 0 Morocco 100K - 500K
21 NMB Mobile Bank 4 0 1 Zimbabwe 10K - 50K
1, to produce message digests, which have already been
accepted as insecure [40, 54]. Banks still use them although
they are aware of this fact. They assume that ordinary
attackers are not capable of breaking them. However, it is
still possible for experienced attackers to mount a massive-
scale attack by exploiting these weaknesses. It is banks’
liability if they use security-weakened or poisoned third-
party libraries without careful inspection. To avoid “am-
plification effect” caused by the weaknesses in third-party
libraries [55], we strongly recommend banks to carefully
inspect third-party libraries in use.
Remark. The contemporary incomplete security criteria
provide banks wide leeway to use their one-sided judg-
ment about specific security practices. We also observe
that outdated versions and weaknesses from third-party
libraries are all likely to be exploited. They are unfixed
for weeks to months post-disclosure. This gap provides
windows of opportunity for not only sophisticated but
also ordinary attackers with the knowledge and time to
strike. We believe AUSERA can help reduce this gap by
expeditiously informing banks of assessing their security
risks on apps, further generating patches, and verifying
their security.
6 RELATED WORK
Security Analysis of Android Apps. Taint analysis is a
commonly-used method to reveal potential privacy leakage
in Android apps. For example, TAINTDROID [56] is a dy-
namic taint-tracing tool which tracks flows of private data
by modifying DALVIK virtual machine; FLOWDROID and IC-
CTA [57, 58] are both static taint analysis tools that accept the
source and sink configurations for privacy leaks. However,
these tools target on general apps, and thus may not be
able to unveil specific security weaknesses (summarized in
Table 1) when applied for banking apps.
Security Assessment of Banking Apps. In 2015, Reaves et
al. [12] realized the severe weaknesses of branchless banking
apps. They reverse engineered and then manually analyzed
7 apps from developing countries, and last found 28 signifi-
cant weaknesses. Most of these weaknesses remained unre-
solved after one year [15]. Chanajitt et al. [59] also manually
analyzed 7 banking apps, and investigated three types of
weaknesses, including how much sensitive data is stored
on device, whether the original apps can be substituted,
and whether communication with the remote server can be
intercepted. Our study differs from [12, 15, 59] with regards
to the scope of measurement. Whereas [12, 15, 59, 60] mainly
leverage case studies to study banking apps, the focus of
our paper is to develop novel automated detection tech-
niques. Furthermore, we also incorporate multidisciplinary
expertise (e.g., code comprehension, regulations, economics)
to interpret the potential causes of occurrence of security
weaknesses. Our work also differs from alternative topics,
such as functional bugs [61, 62], performance [63] and
fragmentation [64].
Demographic Analysis of Banking Apps. Castle et al. [13]
conducted a manual analysis of 197 Android apps and
interviewed 7 app developers across developing countries
(Africa and South America). They divided 13 hypotheti-
cal attacks into 5 categories and concluded that realistic
concerns are on SMS interceptions, server attacks, MITM
attacks, unauthorized access, etc. Lebeck et al. [65] sum-
marized weaknesses of mobile money apps in developing
economies, and combined existing techniques (e.g., cryp-
tocurrencies) to achieve security and functionality goals.
Parasa et al. [14] studied 9 mostly-used mobile money apps
across 9 Australasian countries, and reported the weak-
nesses in authentication, data integrity, poor protocol im-
plementation, malfunction, and overlooked attack vectors.
They reported that the apps from comparatively developed
countries (e.g., ALIPAY, OSAIFU-KEITAI) also have weak-
nesses. Besides, Taylor et al. [66] adopted two off-the-shelf
tools to roughly scan the apps that are labeled as finance
from Google Play Store. All these prior work adopts small-
scale analysis or is taken by survey, while our results are
obtained in an automated and largest-scale fashion, which
have not been systematically scrutinized before.
Encryption and Authentication of Android Apps. SSL
issues have been widely discussed in [67], which suggests
revisiting the SSL handling in applied platforms (e.g., iOS
and Android). Followed by recent reports [14, 65] and our
observation, we find that many banking apps have fairly
weak or even no authentication and encryption mecha-
nisms. Sounthiraraj et al. [19] proposed to combine static
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and dynamic analysis to identify security problems in SS-
L/TLS for Android apps. Georgiev et al. [18] focused on
SSL connection authentication of non-browser software,
indicating that SSL certificate validation is defective and
vulnerabilities are logical errors, due to the poor design
of APIs to SSL libraries and misuse of such APIs. Egele
et al. [16] checked for violations of 6 cryptographic rules
(using cryptographic APIs) in real-world Android apps.
They applied static analysis to extract necessary information
to evaluate the properties and showed that about 88% of the
apps violate the security rules. For our research, we also
integrate these aforementioned weaknesses as vulnerable
points, and examine whether banking apps contain these
points.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we developed and integrated a set of baseline
security weaknesses to assess the security risk of banking
apps. Based on the baseline, we implemented a three-phase
detection system, termed AUSERA, to automatically identify
weaknesses, achieved with a precision of over 98%. Despite
effective and efficient, we acknowledge that AUSERA may
bring false positives since NLP and static analysis are not
100% accurate, which renders human inspectors to reduce
false positives. We also emphasize if an app has packer
protection and decompilation failure (e.g., obfuscation and
native code), then the app is not checkable by the methods
developed in this paper.
Our findings have revealed that apps owned by sub-
sidiary banks are always less secure than or equivalent to
those owned by parent banks, for which the assumption that
subsidiary banks operate under the host country’s regula-
tions does not hold true. Our communications with banking
agencies show that the timing of responsible disclosure does
not closely align with the date a patch is applied to the app,
providing windows of opportunity for attacker exploitation.
These findings highlight the importance of the design
of automated security risk assessment systems, considering
different types of weaknesses and regulations. By leveraging
these insights, we hope that the RegTech companies and all
stakeholders can progress in improving the risk assessment
and patching process for securing contemporary FinTech.
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